Milan HΓΌbl (1927-1989)
History is written by the victors. Just now, it’s the centralists who are
winning across much of Europe. They have spied their opportunity and seized
it. But history hasn’t finished with
them yet.
There are three reasons why we take an interest in
regionalism on the mainland, and in the regions of France in particular. One is that a Wessex-centred world must view Brittany and Normandy as
a more meaningful ‘next-door’ than Northumbria
or Scotland, separated from
us by Mercia. That’s an illustration of how seeing things
from the perspective of the imperial states creates a bloc mentality that
really does block out other aspects of geographical reality. A second reason is practical solidarity,
because the Jacobin mindset is something that gets passed around Europe like a virus, finding new strength from new
victims. When Alsatians, Catalans or
Tyroleans suffer at the hands of control-freak states, we know very well that
we could be next. The third reason is
ideological solidarity, because English regionalism can be part of a
trans-European ideal, the Europe of a Hundred
Flags. If it fails to see itself in
those terms, then it will fail to achieve its potential to engage and enthuse.
How fares the Europe of a
Hundred Flags today? Very poorly, as one
imperial state after another starts to roll back the gains made since the
Second World War. Europe
is being restructured in ways that threaten to undo all its achievements in
terms of economic (and even political) democracy, social welfare, environmental
protection and cultural autonomy. All
these things need to be defended on a secure territorial basis, the basis provided
by regional identity. Our assets. Our institutions. Our neighbours. Our land.
Our way of life. London parties not welcome. Amazingly, the mainstream Left can’t even
begin to understand the importance of this.
Labour puts up candidates against the nationalist parties in Scotland, Wales
and Cornwall. What good can possibly come of that? Labour ekes out its existence as a parasite
on the system, having no views on how to change it for the better. In some ways, it’s set to make matters
worse. As its continental allies already
are doing.
France
has now definitively redrawn its regional map.
The partly German-speaking region of Alsace
has come off worst, merged with two French-speaking regions to create ‘ALCA’ –
Alsace-Lorraine-Champagne-Ardenne, an area bigger than Belgium. It’s one of several such combinations, doomed
to be known by their initials, just like, as one French MP put it,
cattle-brands. Alsace heads a long list of regions to be
abolished as their number is reduced from 22 to 13. Others include such historic names as Aquitaine, Auvergne, Burgundy, Limousin and Picardy. The one
group who can celebrate are the Mouvement Normand, since the re-unification of Normandy is one feature
of the plan. Wessex
looks out at what will now be officially the coast of Brittany
and Normandy;
it’s only further inland that the chaos becomes evident! They can, as always, look back at Cornwall, with Wessex waiting to take its place
alongside.
So have the Normans
been good garcons and filles? It might
seem so to the Alsatians and the Bretons.
These two peoples are ones whose loyalty to the French State
has often been regarded as suspect, as if loyalty isn’t something that has to
be earned. Now they’re the two peoples
most bitterly disappointed and with good reason to ask why they should remain
part of a State that won’t even recognise their existence. Brittany
remains truncated, while Alsace
will be wiped off the map. A challenge
has been launched in the Constitutional Council, alleging inadequate
consultation, but for now the plan is to implement the cull on 1st January
2016.
During the debates it was made clear that the restoration of
traditional provinces is not something that will be tolerated. Sometimes, as in the case of Normandy, it happens by
accident, but accidents do happen.
Reorganisation is about improving the efficient, functional operation of
the French national territory, as viewed from Paris.
Substitute ‘English’ for ‘French’ and ‘London’
for ‘Paris’ and
it becomes a familiar story. Indeed, an
article in The Regionalist in 1991
stated that “By introducing its own
definition of Brittany, excluding Nantes, France
has been able to sow confusion and to re-assure itself that Brittany
is, after all, only a French region that France can make and unmake at
will.” Before long the phrase was
taken up by Silesian autonomists arguing that the division of Poland into artificial voivodeships is likewise
a project to supplant historic provinces with regions that Poland can make
and unmake at will. Napoleon is as much
a hero to the Poles as to the French, having briefly liberated their country
from the surrounding empires. Yet in
both France and Poland,
notions of national liberty are built upon the ruins of regional identity.
Cross the Alps and we find that the ruling party in Italy
has introduced a Bill to reorganise the Italian regions, a cut from 20 to 12, replacing
historic names like Piedmont and Tuscany with Jacobin-style geographical labels
– Regione Alpina, Regione Appenninica, Regione Adriatica. The message is the same as in France, or England,
or Poland:
regions exist to help the centre manage its territory; they do not deserve to
exist as something worthwhile in their own right or to be an inspiration to
those challenging the centre’s monopoly of real power.
Two proposed casualties are the small regions of Valle d’Aosta and Trentino-Alte Adige, home to Italy’s
French-speaking and German-speaking minorities respectively. Both these areas have a special regional
status that was introduced following the defeat of fascism, in recompense for
persecution under Mussolini. The
German-speakers of south Tyrol feel particularly betrayed, with counter-demands
now being made for greater autonomy, independence and/or re-union with the rest
of Tyrol, from which this area south of the Brenner Pass
was separated after the First World War.
With France
and Italy deracinated, Spain can
expect to be next. One of the happy
peculiarities of regionalisation there was that the boundaries were left largely
to the locals to decide. And one result
of that was a relatively large number of single-province regions that saw no
need to link up with their neighbours.
These account for 6 of the 15 mainland regions. So while there are some large regions with a
similar population to Wessex
– Andalucia and Catalonia for example – there
are others about the size of Cornwall
– Cantabria and La Rioja. Both these
smaller regions are required in their devolution statutes to allow for the
possibility of merger with their big neighbour Castilla-Leon and no doubt will
come under pressure to do the deed. It’s
interesting that Spain
is tightening up its anti-protest laws.
Clearly, those in charge are expecting trouble.
Across Europe, the 2008
financial crisis has spawned new, happy-clappy parties and movements of the
Left. Their leaders talk a lot about
greater public ‘involvement’ in decision-making but are (un)surprisingly cagey
about who will actually take the final, unappealable decisions. Spain’s Podemos is an example,
opposing Catalan independence in favour of having some undefined wider
‘influence’. Moves to get the SNP into
formal coalition with Labour are part of the same outflanking manoeuvre that tries
to tempt with fleeting political concessions instead of agreeing the need for lasting
constitutional changes. (Though getting
to look at the real UK
accounts certainly WILL be tempting for Salmond and Sturgeon!)
Among the large continental states, that just leaves Germany, where
the possibility of re-drawing regional boundaries has come to the surface
several times since 1949. So far, the
democratic Germans have always put firm proposals to the vote and not since
1952 have the voters decided to agree a regional merger. (Even that was largely about re-uniting an
area that had been split by the zones of occupation.) Germany is often quoted as the
model for other continental countries.
In France the debate
was driven – or poisoned – by the idea that France needs regions of ‘European
scale’. Yet Germany is actually marked by huge
diversity. There are regions like Bavaria, almost as big as Ireland,
but also tiny city-states like Bremen and Hamburg.
So what is a region of ‘European scale’? Does the EU have a view? The EU, sensibly, doesn’t. European statistics are kept on the basis of
regional and local units that ultimately are determined by the Member States’
own legislation. Sometimes that works in
favour of identity, as when Cornwall
obtained Objective 1 regional aid status, for which it would not have qualified
as part of a slightly more prosperous Devonwall area. Sometimes it can result in a kind of
statistical apartheid. Welsh local
government is planned to be reorganised again (for the third time in 50
years). The Williams Commission that
looked into the matter disappointed any nationalist who might have longed for
the reconstitution of Morgannwg or Gwent.
The reason? That west-east split,
linking depressed coalfield areas to their respective, wealthier coasts, would
endanger European aid. So the poor
coalfield has to stick together, separate from the coast. In terms of the infrastructure European aid
might fund, it’s nonsense, as transport largely radiates from Cardiff
and Newport,
following the valleys from south to north.
So much for a Europe that
works for its peoples. Instead we have
inflexible funding rules – the Europe of the
figures – re-shaping our very constitution, for good or ill. The most sensible boundaries – in terms
of community geography – may be ruled out in favour of much less sensible
arrangements in order to save the funding.
Who
are the EU’s real masters then, if not us?
A generation ago there was the fervent hope that an alliance of
europeanists and regionalists might be the twin millstones that would grind
away the imperial states, dividing up their powers between them. If the EU hasn’t been the most active of
allies, it’s perhaps because the European ideal has been much more easily
co-opted by the centralists, by those who wish to write the imperial-state idea
wider still. And that shouldn’t surprise
us. The EU is the creature of the
treaties that establish it and those treaties are written by the Member
States. They may concede consultative
institutions like the Committee of the Regions but they aren’t going to sign
their own death warrant. Rather than
meet the financial crisis by cutting their own wasteful spending and devolving
power, they look to save money by cutting out somebody else’s tier and
centralising power instead. Money
has to be saved now, urgently, if the centre itself is to be saved. Attacking any identity lucky enough to have
been respected this far is the quickest win.
The promise in ‘The Vow’ to not abolish the Scottish Parliament
some time down the road is significant not because it was said but because it
was thought necessary to say it.
More recently, the EU bureaucracy itself has realised the
importance of keeping its national paymasters sweet. Barroso could have opened up a debate on
internal enlargement, about the further treaty changes needed to avoid any
ambiguity over what happens when part of a Member State
secedes. His neutrality was just too
Pilate-like for the EU’s own good. It
came across not as neutrality but as change-weariness. Not more treaty negotiations. Just to please the Scots and the
Catalans. Do they really think their
national freedom should matter that much?
Juncker has already set the tone of his presidency, sceptical about environmental
and social protections that hinder Europe’s
bid to join the race to the bottom. His
warning to Greek voters about the kind of government they should or shouldn’t
elect is further proof that the ‘post-democratic’ Europe
advocated by Peter Mandelson is firmly taking shape.
Regionalists have always been wary of Europhile claims,
while equally distancing ourselves from Eurosceptic adoration of the imperial
states. There is a genuinely third way
that is not about those states, nor about a Jacobin map of Europe
where identity is to be erased as a barrier to ever closer union. Actions produce reactions and the current war
on identity will produce a renewed determination to resist. A determinaton to build a different Europe,
the Europe of a Hundred Flags, in place of the worthless regimes in London,
Paris, Rome and Madrid – and of their Brussels puppet. (That so many assume Brussels to be the puppet-master just shows
how well the imperial states know their work.)
We should increasingly expect to see nationalist and
regionalist parties succeed at the polls, making inroads into the dead thinking
of Europe’s indistinguishably conservative / socialist
establishment, while seeing off those equally indistinguishable challengers who
are just more of the same.
It’s been said, and not wholly in jest, that a nationalist
is a regionalist who means it. One who
isn’t fooled by the Labour Party or the Parti Socialiste into backing change that
isn’t really there. Many regionalists,
who’ve been deliberately moderate to win concessions from the centre that are
now being torn up in scorn and suspicion, will be asking whether separatism is
such a dirty word after all. States with
a more authoritarian tradition will be turning up the heat. States with a less authoritarian tradition
will be trading clunking old chains for sleek new wires. Either way, advocates of autonomy will need
to be careful who and what they trust.