The solution, of course, is
to decentralise so that what voters get is a better match for what they’re
prepared to fund. Within Scandinavia itself though, decentralisation has not, so
far, been as great a favourite with the major parties as it might. At the heart of Scandi social democracy is
the idea that everyone is equal. And, therefore, the non sequitur follows that
everything must be the same. As in Jacobin France, all political templates are
equal, but some are definitely more equal than others.
Sweden makes an interesting case study. OECD statistics show that, in 2010, public
spending was 34.8% of GDP in the UK
and 45.5% in Sweden. In the UK,
locally raised taxes amounted to 1.7% of GDP and nationally raised taxes to
26.2%, while in Sweden
the local figure was 16.1% and the national figure 23.7%. (The balance is accounted for by social
security funds like National Insurance.)
The lesson seems to be that if folk know that the money they pay to keep
society from falling apart is raised and spent where they can see it being
raised and spent then they’ll be more supportive of the idea. Even in the USA,
where public spending was only 24.8% of GDP, the local figure was 3.9%, more
than double the figure in the UK.
In Sweden’s case
the results of local spending are immediately evident to the visitor in a very
well-kept environment. There's a
county-based public transport system (Swedish counties being of regional
scale), delivered by private contractors but to the county’s specification and
livery. Besides buses, this can include regional
railways, trams and ferries, with timed tickets interchangeable between
modes. Look out for the bus shelters
changing to a different design and the buses turning a different colour and you’ll
know you’ve crossed the county boundary.
In such small, symbolic ways, local identity is made manifest even in a
globalised economy.
Nonetheless, there is
something rotten in the state of Sweden. The long shadow of half-a-century of social
democratic rule has left it as perhaps the most totalitarian society in western
Europe. Stories abound of children seized
by social services for parents’ minor infractions of the rules of political
correctness. Governments of the Left
were still practising eugenics and forced sterilisation in the 1970s; in 1932
the Swedish State Institute of Race Biology at Uppsala was publishing studies of the Sami to
proclaim how inferior they were and promote their sterilisation.
The Sami have had a hard
time all round. Centuries of persecution
for being different, then patronising policies to ensure that ‘the Lapps will
remain Lapps’, depriving them of the technological means to function
politically in the modern world. And at
last some limited recognition with the creation in 1993 of Sweden’s Sami Parliament, a consultative body
which also has equivalents in Norway
and Finland,
and then in 2000 official minority status for their language.
The Sami remain as a distinct
people because of their relationship to the land and to the nomadic occupations
it provides. At this point, Sweden’s
accommodating approach hits the rocks. Folklore
and costumes are fine – accurate or inaccurate – and good for tourism, but
natural resources are the common property of all Swedes. Development policies have introduced roads,
railways, hydro-electric schemes and managed forestry that have all played
havoc with reindeer herding. The
alternatives of fishing and hunting have been curtailed by the Swedish State’s confiscation of Sami land
rights. Demands that indigenous people provide
proof of title to support their claims to State property turn reality on its
head: the truth is that indigenous people belong to the land, not the other way
round, but either way they’re a unit.
There’s talk of expanding
the Sami Parliament’s role to include land management but for radicals it’s not
enough to be allowed to manage a heritage they’re not allowed to own. For some Sami, a Swedish identity – or a
Norwegian, Finnish or Russian one – is something to cling to, a second string
to the bow. For others, the battle to
preserve the Sami language in the face of past attempts to suppress it remains
a painful memory, ‘the Sami sore’, and for those who regard that history as reason
enough to mistrust Stockholm nothing less than a separate Sameland will do.
The treatment of the Sami
shows how repressive the parties of the Left can be when everything lines up
for them. Unbroken rule for 40
years. Under a doctrine of national
unity – folkhemmet (‘the people’s
home’) – that embodied a real enough sense of community but allowed for no
differentiation. And all set in a
country that used to be one of the most aggressive on earth. Sweden’s glory days ended in the
early 18th century when the cost of an all-conquering army could no longer be
sustained. In the previous century it dominated
the Baltic and northern Germany
and even had a colony in North America: New Sweden, today’s Delaware
and Pennsylvania. For all the protests about laid-back Swedes,
such a legacy is bound to linger.
Psychologically, there’s
probably nowhere else in Europe that provides such an instructive parallel to
the UK, as the UK continues
its own transition into post-imperial self-justification. Last at war in 1814, and so never forced fundamentally
to modernise its self-image, Sweden also shares with the UK a tendency to refer
to the heartland of Europe as ‘the continent’, something from which both
consider themselves detached.
The similarity shows too in
the absence of a regional dimension to Sweden’s
constitution, though as in the UK
there have been moves to regionalise, badly, ignoring readily available historical
precedents. Sweden
has been attempting to negotiate the merger of its 21 counties into 6 or 9
regions, following the pattern of a similar centralisation implemented in Denmark in
2007. Since 1999 three Swedish counties
have been designated as regions on a trial basis, with additional powers devolved
to them. Since it’s only a trial, they’re
assured of nothing.
Nationalists and regionalists
should note that bureaucracies under pressure always centralise, even if
letting go would produce better outcomes.
(In Denmark,
the county councils raised their own taxes; the regions that have replaced them
do not, being largely funded centrally.)
It’s a process that can be seen at work in Scotland
and Wales
at present and in the creation of unitary counties and metro mayors; it’s also
a process we need to denounce where it runs unreasonably against the grain of
the decentralisation we seek.
Some of Sweden’s
counties can be fiercely independent in spirit.
Dalarna is famous for its small, painted wooden horses that have become
a national symbol, but that fact only shows how effortlessly Sweden has dealt
with local identity – by nationalising it, absorbing it and disarming it. What’s Dalarna’s is everybody’s. Only in the southern tip of Sweden has an
identity of regional scale resulted in a questioning of Swedishness itself.
The region of Scania or Skåneland
– the three counties of Blekinge, Halland and Skåne (along with the Danish island of Bornholm)
– was historically as separate as Scotland. (It’s also where the Old English poem Beowulf is thought to be set and where
the Normans
originated.) Sweden’s royal arms – three
gold crowns on a blue shield – are thought to represent the three kingdoms
ruled over by King Magnus Eriksson, who died in 1364. That is to say, Norway,
Sweden
and Scania. For most of its recorded
history down to 1658, Scania was one of the three provinces of Denmark, though
always protective of its autonomy. Its
landscape and architecture remain much more Danish than Swedish.
The Treaty of Roskilde that
transferred it definitively to Sweden
in 1658 included all the usual promises about respecting traditional
privileges, soon laughed away. The
Scanians’ parliament was illegally abolished and a cultural war was set in
motion to Swedify everything from the language to clerical dress. Yet Scanians still speak differently. Written down, Danish and Swedish are separate
languages, but Sweden
is a large country: Danes can understand southern Swedes and vice-versa, while
northern Swedes do need the subtitles for Danish films. Especially since the Øresund
Bridge opened in 2000, Malmö has become
in effect a suburb of Copenhagen
(as viewers of The Bridge will be
aware). A Scanian regionalist party
ought to be able to undo a historic injustice and allow the pivotal point of
the Baltic to look both ways, to be almost Danish, and not quite as Swedish as
others.
It ought to, yes, but what
has happened? The irony is that if
Scania has provided one-third of royal Sweden’s identity, and a name and
historic logo for some internationally renowned trucks, that’s as far as it
goes. Labels in Stockholm’s
Nordic Museum
repeatedly fall over the fact of Scania, telling visitors that the custom is this in southern Sweden and that in the rest of the country, or that
particular traditions in painting and weaving are unique to the south. It’s all reminiscent of the days when Scotland was just ‘North Britain’ and Cornwall was part of the ‘West
Country’. There had to be a reckoning.
It came in 1979 with the
launch of Skånepartiet, the Scania Party.
Scanian regionalism ranges from grumbling about Stockholm getting everything to demands for
full independence. The party’s populist policies
called for the abolition in Scania of Sweden’s State-owned off-licence
monopoly, Systembolaget, and the creation of a Scanian commercial television
channel. But Skånepartiet also decided
to play the anti-immigration (and especially anti-Islam) card, a calculation
that worked well enough in Malmö in the mid-80s. Then its fortunes took a turn for the worse,
its number of elected representatives dwindling until 2006, since when it has
had none.
Its place has been taken by
the Sweden Democrats, a Swedish version of UKIP or the Front National that
emerged first in Scania and has since spread across central Sweden. Like its French and UK equivalents,
the party wants a single, uniform national culture. It has no time for minorities, however many
thousands of years they can claim to have been in the country. It wants to abolish the Sami Parliament,
claiming that the parliament’s existence discriminates against those in
Sameland who are not Sami and do not rely on the traditional way of life. It’s curious how happy far Right parties are
to rant about colonists coming in and changing how we live but never recognise
themselves in the description. ‘They’
are immigrants; ‘we’ are ex-pats.
In the 2014 elections, the
Sweden Democrats stormed to 12.9%, and 49 seats in the Riksdag. They’re one of a group of far Right parties
now making headway in each of the Nordic countries. That’s bad news for regionalists;
Skånepartiet may be rueing their choice of strategy. To play the anti-immigrant card when an
influx of immigrants into your region is one of its distinctive characteristics
may look attractive; once that influx extends nationwide it’s nationwide
parties that will pick up the resulting protest vote. The Swedish Right have also been able to dig
deep into the votes of the Swedish Left.
The Left have moved on to new fields of political correctness, leaving
their traditional folkhemmet power
base behind. Meanwhile, the tensions
resulting from mass immigration are calling into question the very survival of
the Scandinavian welfare model. A party
that will defend the legacy of folkhemmet
when its creators will not, a party that prioritises Swedes in Sweden, is
bound to do well.
Then, this month, two
gruesome murders in an IKEA store in Västerås, near Stockholm, carried out by an Eritrean migrant,
shocked the nation. The latest YouGov poll indicates that the Sweden Democrats are now the top political party in Sweden. Polling at 25.2%, they beat the ruling Social
Democrats, on 23.4%. Watch Sweden
closely and you’ll see the tide on the turn.
It won’t be a pretty sight; Game
of Thrones fans might care to note that Västerås is pronounced rather like ‘Westeros’.
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